




1969, international transactions of the United States re-
flected to an unprecedented extent the impact on capital flows of
anti-inflationary monetary measures. While demand and price
developments here and abroad prevented any significant re-
covery in the balance on trade and services, a huge net inflow of
private foreign funds—attracted by relatively high U.S. interest
rates—served to prevent pressure on the international monetary
reserves of the United States. Anticipation of changes in the
exchange rate parities of the French franc and the German mark,
and then the realization of those changes, also produced very
large flows of capital among countries. Because of the huge net
inflow of foreign liquid private capital to the United States last
year the two standard measures of "balance" in the country's
international transactions—the official settlements and the
liquidity concepts—produced divergent results.
For 1969 as a whole the surplus on goods and services was
$0.4 billion smaller than in 1968. However, improvement came
late in the year, as the effects of a dock strike were overcome, and
exports continued rising as imports leveled off. The combined
total of recorded and unrecorded outflows of U.S. private
capital was considerably larger in 1969, while inflows of for-
eign private capital to purchase long-term types of U.S. assets
were reduced. But whatever impact these developments might
have had on the strength of the dollar in exchange markets was
more than offset by an inflow of $9 billion of liquid funds from
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commercial banks abroad into short-term assets held in this
country—mainly through borrowing by U.S. banks in the Euro-
dollar market. Some reversal of these inflows has already oc-
curred in the early months of this year.
Several developments in 1969 served to strengthen the inter-
national monetary mechanism: the historic decision to begin
creating Special Drawing Rights; further consolidation of the
two-tier gold arrangements, which helps to lessen the disruptive
potential of gold speculation; and wider discussion of the benefits
from timely adjustments of exchange rates that are out of line,
including a general review within the International Monetary
Fund of various proposals to introduce greater flexibility to aid
TABLE 1
U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1960-69















































Balance on goods and services'. .
Merchandise, excl. military....





Remittances and pensions, net
U.S. Govt. grants' and capital, net, excl.
nonscheduled repayments
U.S. private capital, net
Foreign capital
4, excl. reserve transactions5




(sum of lines 3 through 8)
Change in U.S. liabilities to commercial banks
abroad
Nonscheduled repayments of U.S. Govt.
credits and net U.K. official transactions
in U.S. securities other than Treasury
issues
Balance on official reserve transactions basis...
(sum of lines 9, 10, and 11)
Financed by:
Decline (+) in U.S. reserve assets
(of which gold)













































































MEMO: Balance on liquidity basis. -2.9 -2.1 .2 -7.1
1 Excluding transfers under military grants.
2 Excluding undistributed earnings of subsidiaries.
3 Excluding military grants.
4 Including assets in the United States of international and regional institutions other than the IMF.
5 "Reserve transactions" include, in addition to those included in the standard classification of
official reserve transactions (line 12), net U.K. official transactions in U.S. securities other than U.S.
Treasury issues (included in line 11).
NOTE.—Details may not add to totals because of rounding.






















1960-64, annual average. 1965-69, an-
nual data.
the adjustment process. Further progress toward a smoothly func-
tioning system depends both on U.S. success in restructuring its
international transactions toward a larger surplus on trade and
services, with lessened reliance on liquid capital inflows, and on
appropriate adjustment policies of other countries.
Neither of the two conventional measures of the over-all balance
of payments serves to convey the changes in the underlying inter-
national situation of the United States from 1968 to 1969. The
liquidity deficit greatly exaggerates the extent of the worsening.
It does not count as an offset to borrowings by U.S. banks from
foreigners the increase in U.S. short-term assets abroad, an in-
crease that is implied by the swollen negative errors and omissions
item in 1969. But it counts as an adverse factor the reversal of
"special" foreign official investments in nonliquid U.S. liabilities,
which reduced the liquidity deficit by over $2 billion in 1968
but increased it by nearly $1 billion in 1969.
The increase in U.S.-owned short-term funds abroad, which
added to the supply of Euro-dollar deposits available for U.S.
bank borrowing, is sometimes considered a "circular" flow; that
is, these funds merely flow through the Euro-dollar market as
the depositors seek higher interest rates than can be paid on
domestic deposits. When there is a net reflow of these funds to the
United States, there will be an apparent improvement of the
liquidity balance. It should be noted, however, that the rise of net
payments contained in the errors and omissions item in 1969 may
have had components other than reversible short-term capital
flows.
On the other hand, the large surplus registered in the official
settlements balance in 1969 cannot be taken as a sign of funda-
mental improvement, since a major element was a huge inflow of
foreign private liquid funds that is essentially interest-sensitive
and may be easily reversed whenever interest rates move relative-
ly lower in the United States. The impact of this inflow on foreign
exchange markets was so large that dollar reserves of foreign
monetary authorities held in the United States were reduced by
$1.5 billion, while U.S. reserve assets increased $1.2 billion.
In 1969 the U.S. surplus on transactions in goods and services
declined further to $2.1 billion, $0.4 billion less than in 1968.
The surpluses for the past 2 years have been far below the nearly
$6 billion average of the 1960-67 period. Last year's decline in
Federal Reserve Bulletin: April 1970318 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN a APRIL 1970





196064 1965 1967 1969
1960-64, annual average. 1965-69, half
years at annual rates.
INVESTMENT INCOME
PAYMENTS and RECEIPTS





1960-64, annual average. 1965-69, half
years at annual rates.
the balance reflected higher interest payments to foreigners and a
worsening in the balance on military transactions. The surplus on
merchandise trade, which had fallen to the extremely low level of
$0.6 billion in 1968, was only slightly larger in 1969. In the
second half of 1969, however, the balance on goods and services
rose to an annual rate of about $3.0 billion. The trade surplus
improved sharply after the dockworkers' strike ended, and in the
period December 1969-February 1970 it was at an annual rate
of $2.5 billion.
U.S. receipts of income from direct investments and other
assets abroad increased sharply to a record of nearly $9 billion,
but payments on foreign assets and investments in the United
States rose even more, as a result of higher interest rates and the
greatly increased total of U.S. liquid liabilities.
The balance on military goods and services transactions also
worsened in 1969 as sales of goods and services under military
sales contracts increased less than military expenditures abroad.
There was a strong rise—15 per cent—in receipts from foreign
tourists last year, but there was a larger absolute increase in for-
eign expenditures by U.S. tourists.
Merchandise trade. Although the trade balance—as shown in
the balance of payments accounts—was virtually unchanged
between 1968 and 1969, a rough adjustment in both years to
eliminate the effects of actual or threatened strikes by longshore-
men and by steel, copper, and aluminum workers would raise
the export surpluses to about $lVi billion in 1968 and $1 billion
in 1969. The export balance improved markedly in the second
half of 1969, reflecting strong demand and high utilization of
productive capacity abroad, while the expansion of aggregate
demand in the United States was slowed.
Though the over-all trade balance showed little change from
1968 to 1969, there were sizable swings in the balances with
major regions and countries. Our export surplus in trade with
Western Europe rose sharply—by nearly $ 1 billion—and a some-
what smaller increase was recorded in the export surplus with
Latin America. These gains were offset by a decline in the surplus
with the less-developed countries of Asia and Africa and by an
increase in our already large trade deficits with Canada and
Japan.
The major portion of the improvement in the trade balance
with Western Europe was with the Common Market countries,
where the expansion of economic activity and inflationary pres-
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sures was especially marked. The export surplus with these
countries exceeded $1 billion in 1969 compared with a very
small surplus—$150 million—in 1968. Nevertheless, the surplus
in 1969 was still less than half the 1960-64 average.
Trade with the United Kingdom was roughly in balance in
1969 and showed only a small change from 1968. In 1960-64
our export surplus with that country had averaged about $300
million.
Although there was an impressive rise—18 per cent—in ex-
ports to Japan in 1969, imports from that country expanded by
20 per cent. As a result, the trade deficit with Japan increased
to nearly $1.4 billion compared with $1.1 billion in 1968. Much
the same situation prevailed in our trade with Canada; despite a
large advance in exports, the growth in arrivals of goods from
Canada was even greater, and our trade deficit, which had moved
into the red in 1968 for the first time, grew to more than $800
million in 1969. In the first half of the 1960's, our average trade
balance with Canada had been a surplus of about $750 million.
Changes in trade patterns. These shifts in U.S. trade balances
with various regions or countries are useful indicators of changes
in our basic economic relationships with them, but such bilateral
balances provide only a limited view of our over-all trade per-
formance. For a broader perspective, trends in the U.S. trade
position should be measured against the over-all development of
world trade and production.
World trade has become increasingly concentrated among the
industrial countries and in manufactured goods. Exports of in-
dustrial countries accounted for 75 per cent of the value of world
trade in 1969 compared with 69 per cent in 1960. The value of
manufactured goods in world trade more than doubled during the
1960's whereas trade in primary products expanded at less than
half that rate. Prices of primary products were relatively un-
changed throughout the period—except for some rise in 1969—
while prices of internationally traded manufactured goods rose
by about 10 per cent.
Changes in U.S. trade have generally paralleled these shifts in
world trade. About 70 per cent of total U.S. exports went to the
industrial countries in 1969, compared with less than 65 per cent
in 1960. For imports the shift was even more pronounced—73
per cent came from industrial countries in 1969 versus 60 per
cent in 1960. The commodity composition of U.S. imports has
also changed correspondingly in the last 10 years. Finished man-
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ufactures constituted about 55 per cent of total imports in 1969
compared with 35 per cent in 1960. The shift in the commodity
composition of exports was less dramatic; 65 per cent of total
exports in 1969 were finished manufactures compared with 55
per cent in 1960.
Against this background one question that needs to be ex-
amined is whether the recent shrinkage in the U.S. trade balance
has resulted from a weakening in exports, from an acceleration
of imports, or from some combination of the two. In terms
of rates of growth, the initial impression is that exports did rea-
sonably well in 1969; their value rose 9 per cent despite losses due
to the dock strike (which lasted 2 to 3 months for various East
Coast and Gulf ports) compared with an average rate of growth
from 1960 to 1964 of about 6.5 per cent, and from 1965 to
1967 of about 5 per cent. However, such comparisons of current
with past growth rates are less meaningful than a measure of U.S.
export performance relative to the potential expansion of U.S.
sales to foreign countries—that is, a comparison of changes in
U.S. exports with changes in world output and world trade.
Changes in U.S. exports generally paralleled changes in for-
eign industrial activity throughout the 1960's. At the same time,
there has been a long-term tendency for the volume of interna-
tional trade to expand at a faster rate than total world produc-
tion. This disparity between changes in world trade and world
output appears to have been particularly large in both 1968 and
1969. For the United States to maintain a reasonable trade bal-
ance while imports are rising rapidly, it is necessary for the vol-
ume of U.S. exports to expand faster than world output. But that
has not been happening.
The United States has not done so well as some of its foreign
competitors—Germany, Japan, and Italy, in particular. In con-
trast to a relatively stable relationship for the United States from
1961 to 1969, Germany's exports have expanded about 25 per
cent faster than world output, Italy's over 80 per cent faster, and
Japan's more than twice as fast. The performance of the United
Kingdom has lagged; from 1961 to 1969 the growth in the
quantity of U.K. exports was about 15 per cent less than the
growth in world output.
Market shares. Another view of trends in the U.S. export
position is given by measuring changes in the U.S. share of world
trade. In 1969 the value of world exports—excluding those to the
United States—increased by nearly 15 per cent, the largest year-to-
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Shares are derived from export data that exclude exports to the United States.
year advance in the 196O's. Since U.S. exports rose by only about
9 per cent, the U.S. share of world exports fell to just over
18 per cent. The average share in 1960-64 had been about
19.5 per cent, and it had dipped slightly to about 19 per cent in
1965-67. Although the changes in the U.S. share appear to be
relatively small, a variation of 1 percentage point at the current
high values of world trade is equivalent to a change of over $2
billion in exports. For both Germany and Japan the share of total
world trade increased by more than 2 percentage points from the
early 1960's to 1969 while the U.K. share fell by 2.5 points.
Total world trade in agricultural products has increased much
more slowly than trade in manufactured goods, and the U.S.
share of world trade in agricultural products has not varied
much since 1960. Such products still account for a relatively
large share of total U.S. exports—15 per cent in 1969 compared
with 25 per cent in the earlier years of the decade. For Germany
and Japan exports of agricultural commodities are much less im-
portant. A partial explanation for the reduction in the U.S. share
of aggregate world trade, therefore, is the relatively greater
weight of agricultural commodities in total exports of this country
as compared with other industrial countries.
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* W. Germany revalued in Mar. 1961
and Oct. 1969. t U.K. devalued in
Nov. 1967. Annual data.
With respect to trade in manufactured goods—excluding ex-
ports to the United States—there has been a clear slippage in the
U.S. share. Data for the first 9 months of 1969 show that the U.S.
share of world trade in these goods in 1969 had fallen to 22 per
cent from 25 per cent in 1960. Japan and Italy on the other hand
each increased its share of the world market for manufactured
products over the decade of the 1960's. Germany's share showed
little change.
The downward drift in the U.S. share of world exports results
from a combination of factors that are difficult to quantify.
Among them are the effects of relative price changes on com-
petitive positions; the development and growth of regional blocs
—such as the Common Market and the European Free Trade
Association; nontariff barriers; shifts in the commodity composi-
tion of world trade; and technical rigidities in U.S. productive
patterns. The importance of the price factor is indicated in the
accompanying chart, showing that unit values—approximating
prices—of U.S. exports of manufactured goods have increased
much more sharply than those of Germany, Japan, and Italy,
particularly since 1964, though export unit values in those coun-
tries too have tended to rise recently.
A major element in our declining share of world trade is our
poor performance in exporting domestic consumer goods. The
greatest expansion in international sales of foreign industrial
countries has been in consumer goods, but the United States, for
various reasons, is not a major exporter of such goods. Consumer
goods account for about 12 per cent of our exports of nonagri-
cultural commodities, and that proportion has not changed since
1960. Meanwhile, our imports of such goods have risen to over
25 per cent of total imports from 17 per cent in 1960.
Import competition. A further way to assess the effectiveness of
our trade performance is to examine how well U.S. producers
compete with foreign suppliers in our domestic market. One
measure of this is the relationship of imports to total U.S. out-
put. Since 1964 the ratio of the value of U.S. imports to current
value GNP has increased substantially. The ratio in the second
half of 1969—3.95 per cent—compares with an average of
about 2.9 per cent in 1960-64 and 3.45 per cent in 1965-68.
About half of the increase in this ratio from the 1960-64 average
occurred in the last 2 years and represents about $4 billion more
of imports per year than if the 1967 ratio had prevailed.
An increase in this ratio is normal, since for most industrial
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countries, as noted earlier, growth in the volume of world trade
has exceeded the rate of increase in world output. What is un-
usual about the U.S. position as compared with that of other large
industrial trading nations is that there has been no corresponding
increase in the export/GNP ratio. The import/GNP ratio for
Germany, for example, increased from an average 13.9 per cent
in 1960-64 to about 16.5 per cent in 1969, and at the same time
its export ratio moved up from 15.6 to 19.2 per cent.
Japan's ratios of trade to total domestic output are quite
different from those of most other industrial countries. In that
country imports and exports are each a relatively small portion
of its GNP—about 9 per cent for each—probably the smallest
for the industrial countries except the United States. Japan's
import/GNP ratio has actually declined in the 1960's, while
its export ratio has increased somewhat. Inasmuch as that
country relies on large quantities of imported industrial materials
as basic inputs to its industrial production, the relatively low level
of its import/GNP ratio is quite remarkable.
Italy's relationship of trade to output is similar to that of
Japan; that is, its import/GNP ratio has declined while the ex-
port/GNP ratio has increased. These percentages for Italy, how-
ever, are much larger than for Japan—about 14 per cent for each
in 1968.
While the trends in trade mentioned above help to identify
generally the nature of the difficulties we face in improving our
trade balance, a great deal of study is needed to establish the
precise effects of the factors involved. For instance, the out-
standing success scored by Germany, Japan, and Italy, which has
been stressed above, reflects not only such basic economic devel-
opments as the rebuilding of an efficient industrial base and effec-
tive design and marketing of products for which world demand
is growing rapidly, but also to some degree tendencies for the
currencies of these countries to be undervalued at times, and for
their producers to favor export over domestic sales expansion.
lpRii¥Ai1:; CJWiri'Al Flows of both U.S. and foreign private capital have been greatly
affected in recent years by innovations in capital markets, by
sharp changes in interest rates transmitted with great efficiency
by the Euro-dollar market, by restrictions of various kinds, by
occasional speculative flurries, and by changes in underlying in-
vestment patterns. As these flows have grown, they have become
an increasingly large and volatile element in the balances of pay-
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ments of the United States and other countries—calling for more
careful coordination of national monetary policies and of financ-
ing arrangements. The following comments are necessarily brief
and are concentrated on the U.S. experience, as measured in the
balance of payments and also as reflected in the international
debtor-creditor position of this country.
U.S. private capital. Until recently a regular feature of the U.S.
balance of payments was a large net outflow of private capital—
even including increases in liquid private assets of foreigners in
the United States (Table 2). The major element was an outflow
of U.S. private capital, which averaged $4.5 billion in the 1960-
67 period. This outflow reached a peak of $6.6 billion in 1964,
but thereafter it was held in check by restrictions and, in 1966
and again in 1969, by relatively tight credit conditions in the
United States. The over-all outflow of U.S. private capital in 1969
was not far from the average of the earlier period.
About 60 per cent of the outflow of U.S. capital since 1960
has been for direct investments. In addition, U.S. direct investors
have added about $1.5 billion annually, on average, to their
TABLE 2
PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS





U.S. and foreign private capital, net outflows... -
(Net flow, excl. foreign liquid assets in U.S.).. (-
2 U.S. private assets abroad.
3 Direct investment outflows
4 Net purchases of foreign securities
5 Claims reported by U.S. banks
6 Short-term assets related to direct investments >.
7 Other
8 Foreign private assets in U.S., nonliquid
9 Related to U.S. direct investments abroad
2....
10 U.S. corporate stocks
1
11 Other U.S. securities (excl. Treasury issues) *...
12 Other nonliquid assets in U.S.<
13 Foreign private liquid assets inU.S
14 International and regional institutions (excl.
IMF)






































































MEMO: Capital transactions related to U.S. direct
investments (lines 3, 6, and 9.) -1,846 -3,038 -1,196 -1,559
1 Unexpended proceeds of the new issues included in line 9, held abroad.
2 Includes new security issues sold abroad for the purpose of financing direct investments plus all
long-term borrowing abroad by U.S. corporations although the latter may include some borrowing for
other purposes.
3 Excludes transactions included in line 9.
* Includes transactions of international and regional institutions other than the IMF.
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TABLE 3
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES










































































U.S. assets and investments abroad' 31. S 68.0 135.3 143.4




Banking claims and other 1.4
Short-term, total 1.5
Reported by banks .9
Other .6
U.S. Government credits and claims* 11.1 17.0 28.5 30.7
U.S. monetary reserve assets' 1.4 1.6 4.8 5.1




U.S. corporate stocks 2.9
Other long-term 1.7
Short-term reported by nonbanks .7
U.S. Government .7
Liquid liabilities 8.9
To private foreigners, total 4.3
To foreign banks (incl. U.S. bank branches) 2.1
To others 2.2
To official accounts, total* 4.6
Liabilities of U.S. banks 2.4
U.S. Government obligations 2.2
MEMO: U.S. monetary gold 22.8 17.8 10.9 11.9
1 Excludes U.S. monetary gold.
2 Other than U.S. monetary reserve assets.
3 Includes, in addition to foreign reserve holders, other foreign government agencies.
' Estimated.
NOTE.—Data for 1950, 1960, and 1968 are as published by the Office of Business Economics, U.S.
Dept. of Commerce; data for 1969 are estimates based on capital flows as reported by the OBE, plus
rough allowances for reinvested earnings, changes in market valuations, and currency revaluations.The
basis of valuation is as follows: direct investments at book values as appearing, in principle, on the books
of the affiliates rather than the head offices; securities at market values; other assets and liabilities at
stated values in the accounts of banks and other debtors or creditors. For more detailed data see Survey
of Current Business, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, October 1969. Details may not add to totals because of
rounding.
investment in foreign affiliates by reinvesting profits. As a result,
the book value of direct foreign investments (Table 3) has
rocketed from $12 billion in 1950 to $32 billion in 1960, and to
nearly $70 billion at the end of 1969. It should be noted that
these book values cover only the U.S. investment in these enter-
prises—there are also sizable debt and equity investments by for-
eigners. Consequently, the book value of the total assets—both
fixed and current—of the foreign affiliates is considerably larger
than these totals suggest. Moreover, recent surveys of the Depart-
ment of Commerce indicate that corporate investors are planning
to expand their foreign expenditures for plant and equipment very
sharply in 1970.
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Because of the regulations that now limit the transfer of U.S.
capital to finance expansion of assets abroad, the investors have
borrowed abroad on a larger scale than in earlier years. Conse-
quently, the net outflow of U.S. funds for direct investment
(Table 2, last line) was reduced to $1.2 billion in 1968—when
the mandatory rules were put into effect. In 1969 the supply of
foreign capital to finance U.S. direct foreign investments was
limited by a weakened U.S. stock market and a sharp rise in in-
terest rates on short-term and other debt instruments abroad.
Consequently, there was some increase in the use of U.S. funds
for direct investment—though the outflow was still well within
the limits allowed by the regulations. Many corporations were
able to cushion the drop in foreign borrowing by using the pro-
ceeds of borrowings made in 1968 (Table 2, lines 9 and 6).
Net portfolio purchases of foreign securities by U.S. investors
have leveled off since the introduction of the interest equaliza-
tion tax in 1963, and much of the borrowing by foreign com-
panies and governments that would normally have been placed
in the U.S. market is now placed in the greatly expanded inter-
national securities markets of Europe. In 1969 sales of foreign
securities in Europe—apart from the issues of U.S. companies
and their affiliates—totaled $2.8 billion, as against $1 billion in
1965. Three-quarters of the sales of new bonds in the U.S. market
in 1969 were for Canadian borrowers. There was also a spurt in
U.S. purchases of Japanese corporate stocks, which were exempt
from the Federal Reserve guidelines for nonbank financial institu-
tions until December 1969.
Changes in claims on foreigners reported by U.S. banks shifted
from an inflow in 1968 to a substantial outflow last year. How-
ever, the 1969 outflow related primarily to claims held for cus-
tomers and to other assets not subject to the Federal Reserve
guidelines. Banking assets subject to the guidelines shifted from
an inflow of $0.6 billion in 1968 to an outflow of $0.2 billion in
1969.
Although capital outflows from the United States have been
held in check by the various restrictions and at times by the
limited availability of funds in the United States, the aggregate
value of U.S. private foreign investments has been rising rapidly;
at the end of 1969 such investments reached an estimated $108
billion (Table 3). The increase during 1969 would have been
larger had it not been for the substantial reductions in the market
values of foreign bonds as yields rose sharply.
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Foreign private capital. The net inflow of foreign private capi-
tal to the United States leaped to more than $13 billion in 1969;
this greatly exceeded the record of the previous year and, as
shown in Table 2 (lines 8 and 13), represented a completely dif-
ferent order of magnitude from earlier experience. Inflows in non-
liquid forms were not so large as in 1968. Lending to U.S. com-
panies in connection with the financing of their foreign affiliates
was considerably lower, reflecting the lessened attractiveness of
PRIVATE CAPITAL INFLOW rises sharply
in 1969 as inflow of
FOREIGN LIQUID FUNDS REACHES PEAK
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
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1960-64 1965
1960-64, annual average. 1965-69, annual data.
convertible debentures as the U.S. stock market declined, as well
as a large carryover of unexpended proceeds of the borrowings in
1968. The experience of dropping prices for U.S. equity issues,
coupled with the attraction of rising yields on Euro-dollar and
other alternative investments, brought a reduction in foreign pur-
chases in the U.S. stock market. Nevertheless, both foreign lend-
ing to U.S. companies and purchases of outstanding stocks re-
mained at much higher levels than had prevailed before 1968.
Holdings of U.S. corporate stocks are the principal form of
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foreign investment in the United States. At the end of 1969 these
investments had a market value of approximately $19 billion.
This was slightly lower than their value a year earlier, because the
steep drop in market values offset the addition from capital
inflows.
Another sizable amount of foreign long-term capital went into
direct investments in the United States; such investments in-
creased more than $1 billion in 1969 to a book value of about
$12 billion. As with U.S. direct investments abroad, the gains in
book value reflect reinvested earnings as well as new parent-
company financing.
By far the largest capital movement in 1969 was the inflow of
foreign private liquid funds amounting to $8.8 billion (Table 2,
line 13). The net inflow included $9.3 billion added to liabilities
of U.S. banks to foreign commercial banks. Of that total, about
$7.1 billion represented increased liabilities of U.S. banks to their
foreign branches, and the remainder included a large increase in
liabilities to foreign banks reported by the U.S. branches or agen-
cies of foreign banks. It is not possible to identify the ultimate
owners of these funds flowing through foreign commercial banks.
As noted, some fraction of the funds obtained represented shifts
by U.S. residents out of deposits and other assets in the United
States. The size of "errors and omissions" in 1969 suggests that
such flows could have been on the order of magnitude of $2 bil-
lion. There is also some evidence that foreign official reserve
holders were increasing their Euro-dollar deposits in 1969. In ad-
dition, a reduction of $0.4 billion occurred in holdings of liquid
assets in this country of nonbank private foreigners—presumably
also largely because of the attraction of Euro-dollar deposit yields
—in contrast to a regular growth in such assets in previous years.
By far the largest source of funds to the Euro-dollar market, how-
ever, has been foreign commercial banks and other residents of
foreign countries, who acquired high-yielding Euro-dollar de-
posits in preference to assets denominated in other currencies.
Flows of this unprecedented magnitude brought considerable
pressure on the reserves of a number of foreign countries and
led to larger increases in interest rates in some countries than
they might have preferred.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT While the U.S. balance of payments accounts throw light on the
POSITION flows of goods, services, and capital with the rest of the world, it
is also useful to view the results of these flows as reflected in the
foreign assets and liabilities of the United States. Such a state-
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ment, as given in Table 3, necessarily lacks precision because of
the many varieties of valuation used and the incompleteness of
data; nor can it accurately convey the great differences in quality
among the types of assets included. It does, however, show some
significant magnitudes and relationships.
Among the U.S. investments abroad, direct private invest-
ments predominate and are far greater than comparable foreign
investments in the United States. In fact, the increase in 1969
alone was equal to some 40 per cent of the total accumulated
value of foreign direct investments in the United States. U.S.
investors also have substantial holdings of foreign securities, but
in this case the comparable foreign investment in the United
States is considerably larger.
In the aggregate, the value of U.S. private long-term invest-
ments abroad is more than double that of the accumulated for-
eign private long-term investments in the United States. However,
the disparity in earnings capacity is even greater; income re-
turned on long-term U.S. investments abroad in 1969 was over
three times the amount paid to foreign investors on their com-
parable holdings in the United States. The difference reflects
partly the form of the investments—the dividend yield on the
large foreign holdings of U.S. stocks is relatively low, while U.S.
direct investments abroad tend to be in industries with relatively
high rates of return compared with the industries in which foreign
direct investments in the United States are concentrated. More-
over, U.S. direct investments abroad returned an additional $1.3
billion in the form of royalties and fees in 1969. From this point
of view alone, therefore, the build-up of a huge investment base
provides substantial support over the long run to the U.S. balance
of payments.
Foreign credits and claims of the U.S. Government (apart
from reserve assets) aggregated about $31 billion at the end of
1969 and included a large amount of loans on extended terms
with low interest rates. U.S. private short-term assets abroad
consisted primarily of credits and loans extended by U.S. banks,
or held by them for their customers, and credits extended by U.S.
exporters. However, by the end of 1969 there were probably
sizable U.S. liquid holdings in the Euro-dollar market that are
not covered in these statistics.
Over the years the emergence of the U.S. dollar as the princi-
pal reserve and transactions currency of the world has meant that
foreign governments, and private foreigners as well, have wished
to add to their stock of liquid assets in the United States. Last
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year in particular the increase in such private holdings was
speeded—at a clearly unsustainable pace—by the high interest
rates paid by U.S. banks. Nearly half of total foreign holdings
in the United States are in quite liquid forms, such as deposits
or other claims on U.S. banks and marketable U.S. Government
obligations.
It is the size and rapid growth of these liquid liabilities over a
long period, coupled with a reduction in U.S. reserve assets (in-
cluding the gold stock), that has focused attention on the liquidity
aspect of the debtor-creditor position. At the end of 1969 U.S.
liquid liabilities totaled $42 billion, as against U.S. official
monetary reserves of $17 billion. In 1960 these figures were $22
billion and $ 19 billion, respectively. However, in the past 2 years
there has been a considerable improvement in our position vis-a-
vis foreign reserve holders. U.S. reserve assets increased by $2
billion, mainly in the form of the reserve position in the IMF,
while assets held in the United States by foreign monetary au-
thorities have been reduced by more than $2 billion.
The designation "liquid" must be considered quite arbitrary;
many private U.S. assets abroad—especially those in the Euro-
dollar market, or built up as excess working balances of foreign
affiliates—are essentially liquid, while a substantial part of the
foreign holdings of liquid claims on the United States represents
balances needed for transactions purposes or as collateral, as well
as a normal component of official or private cash reserves.
Over-all, the U.S. international investment position has grown
stronger through the years, especially as reflected in the income
accounts, even though the too-rapid growth of relatively liquid
liabilities has introduced an element of potential instability.
The experience of the last few years suggests that U.S. in-
vestors will continue to make very large investments abroad un-
der normal conditions—in the absence of governmental restric-
tions or relatively high interest rates in this country. It also ap-
pears that foreign investors now have an increased desire to ex-
pand both their holdings of U.S. equity securities and their direct
investments here—assuming that the U.S. economy maintains
reasonably stable growth. Given the propensity of Americans to
invest abroad—demonstrated not only in recent years but also
much earlier in our history—a steady and growing inflow of in-
vestment capital from abroad helps to establish a viable balance
of payments and a more even distribution of our liabilities among
various types and maturities.
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS The developments of last year and of recent months should
facilitate movement toward a better balance of international
transactions. For the United States, a stronger surplus on goods
and services has emerged as a result of the relaxation of pressures
on productive capacity, coupled with continued growth of de-
mand in other industrial countries. In the early months of this
year exports—especially of machinery—appear to have been
responding well to greater market opportunities abroad. Imports
have risen somewhat, however, partly as a result of increased
prices of coffee and metals. Meanwhile, lower interest rates on
short-term U.S. obligations to foreigners are bringing a substantial
saving in the current account of the balance of payments.
Some adverse changes may be expected in U.S. capital accounts
this year as interest rates here shift downward relative to those
abroad. Direct investors have projected much larger investments
in foreign plant and equipment, and they may use more U.S. funds
than in 1968 or 1969. Also, a sizable reduction in borrowings by
U.S. banks from the Euro-dollar market has already occurred.
Both conventional measures of over-all balance were register-
ing large deficits in the early months of 1970. In the case of the
liquidity balance the extent of the deficit was exaggerated by a
reversal of year-end inflows of capital and liquidations of funds
that had been placed earlier in nonliquid U.S. Treasury obliga-
tions by foreign monetary authorities. The official settlements
balance reflected, in addition to the factors affecting the liquidity
balance (apart from "special" transactions), the flows back into
foreign financial markets of funds previously borrowed in the
Euro-dollar market by U.S. banks. Most of the resulting net gain
in foreign official reserves accrued to the United Kingdom, while
Canada and Japan also experienced gains.
Movement toward a better over-all balance in the world econ-
omy is evident in the improved trade balances of the United King-
dom and France, following reductions in their currency parities
coupled with effective actions to damp excess demand. However,
the effect of the German currency revaluation on that country's
trade surplus has not yet become clear. Japan also seems headed
for another sizable trading surplus in 1970, and Canada scored a
large trade surplus in January-February. It remains to be seen
whether these various trends in trade balances, should they per-
sist, can be accommodated within an over-all structure of trade
and financial flows that would represent a satisfactory equilibrium
in international transactions. •
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